Velayat-e Faqih: a theocratic regime veiled in sectarianism

The Shi’ite Islamic Revolution under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Iran in 1979 shook the global political landscape to its core, with the effects felt by the major powers and every ruling regime throughout the Islamic world.

This huge upheaval was driven not merely by the toppling of the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, but also by the daunting challenges that arose from such a radical transformation in the governing system’s nature.

Advocates of this new Islamic theocratic model insist that its establishment was extremely difficult, given the complete absence of any contemporary Islamic government framework to act as a template or guide.

Iran cannot be ignored. Its vast size and strategic geographical position (acting as gateway to India and roadblock to Russian expansion into Central Asia) make it impossible to bypass, exclude, or isolate from any big regional initiative—whether related to security, politics, or economics.

Its geography means that it can control large stretches of strategically vital warm waters of the Gulf, while its natural resources include minerals, gas, and oil. Furthermore, its population of 92 million people can point to their rich intellectual and cultural legacy. So, if it cannot be ignored, its governance framework (and its religious and historical underpinning) must be understood.

Constitutional laws

The revolutionary discourse and the constitutional laws of the Islamic Republic openly reflect expansionist aims that justify interference in the domestic affairs of other nations. This is rooted in the claim of the revolution’s leader to the leadership of all Muslims.

According to Article 5 of the Iranian constitution, this leader must be a just and devout jurist, well-versed in current affairs, brave, and competent in governance and administration. He is also expected to allocate the nation’s resources to those referred to in the constitution as the “oppressed”.

The widely circulated assertion of Imamate (the belief in the divinely appointed leadership of Ali and his descendants after the Prophet Muhammad) draws its foundation from the concept of ‘Guardianship of the Jurist,’ a theory that concentrates authority over the executive, legislature, and judiciary in the hands of a single figure, who also has the authority to interpret religious rulings.

Divine Imamate

Under this framework, the ruler is treated as infallible—beyond error or objection—even by a consultative body. Ayatollah Khomeini elaborated on this idea extensively, especially in his work Islamic Government. He promoted the notion of ‘Divine Imamate,’ assigning the ruling jurist the same functions attributed to the Imam (understood in Shi’ite doctrine as the Prophet Muhammad’s rightful successors).

According to this belief, the Prophet appointed twelve successors, or caliphs, before his death. The first was Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib—his cousin and son-in-law—followed by his sons al-Hasan and al-Husayn as the second and third Imams. The twelfth and final Imam, known as Imam al-Mahdi, is believed by Shi’ites to be alive but in occultation (hidden from view), destined to reappear in the future to lead the world’s Muslims.

Pull Quote: The revolutionary discourse and the constitutional laws of the Islamic Republic openly reflect expansionist aims that justify interference in the domestic affairs of other nations

Divine Imamate firmly rejects the principle of Shura (consultation) as a valid means of choosing the Imam. According to Shi’ite belief, the right to leadership and caliphate is strictly limited to the Prophet’s family—specifically, the descendants of his cousin, Ali ibn Abi Talib, and of Hussein, the younger brother of the second Imam, Hassan ibn Ali.

This theory fundamentally underpins those who passionately uphold Imamate as a central religious doctrine. Closely connecting prophethood and Imamate, this theory deliberately presents the latter as a direct continuation and completion of the former, strongly emphasising the necessity of vertical, hereditary succession. Consequently, the conviction has firmly taken root among most Shi’ites of the continuing need for Imamate, whether exercised directly or through delegation and representation.

Theory to practice

In promoting his theory, Ayatollah Khomeini did not confine himself to interpreting historical events or examining the hadiths (collections of traditions containing sayings attributed to the Prophet and the Imams of his Household). Rather, he exploited the political upheavals that Iran endured in the preceding centuries, namely the oppressive tyranny of the Qajar kings and the authoritarianism of the Pahlavi dynasty.

These monarchs relentlessly and often arbitrarily expanded their powers without limit or care as to whether their actions conformed to the provisions of Sharia law. They also ignored the fatwas issued by jurists, especially those that opposed or conflicted with their personal ambitions and political goals.

Khomeini saw these rulers as usurpers of authority, lacking the essential qualifications required to lead the Muslim community—especially the critical attributes of knowledge and justice, of the kind that jurists possess. As a result, he incited opposition against these rulers and called instead for the establishment of an Islamic government.

Establishing a theocracy

Implementing Islam was an imperative for him, given the eternal nature of its principles. In his efforts to force through a revolution, he studiously involved nearly all segments of society and its diverse political forces: secular, Islamic, liberal, and socialist. This culminated in 1979 when the Shah was kicked out and the clerics seized power.

What followed was the rapid establishment of a theocratic republic, the clerics carefully removing their former revolutionary allies, most prominently the Freedom Movement led by Mehdi Bazargan, who initially and briefly headed the first post-revolutionary government. The aim was to embed the clergy’s absolute control—and the Supreme Leader’s authority in particular—over all state institutions.

Pull Quote: Khomeini exploited the political upheavals that Iran endured in the preceding centuries, namely the oppressive tyranny of the Qajar kings and the authoritarianism of the Pahlavi dynasty

There had been much talk of a referendum, to ask Iranians if they consented to the creation of an Islamic Republic. Bazargan proposed adding an option to the referendum ballot should also ask if they wanted it to be democratic, but Khomeini categorically rejected the idea, arguing that if Iran opted for an Islamic republic, this implicitly excluded any democratic alternative. Advocates of democracy were labelled ignorant.

The referendum was held on 1 April 1979, with 99% of voters supporting Khomeini’s vision. Subsequently, the constitution of the Islamic Republic was drafted, firmly establishing the authority of the Supreme Jurist (Velayat-e Faqih) as the highest constitutional power in the country. This let Khomeini wield unchecked and absolute authority, free from any form of accountability.

Seated higher

In reality, his powers far exceeded those granted by the constitution and went beyond the limits set between the branches of government. As Supreme Leader, he could directly intervene in—and command the activities of—the Parliament, the Guardian Council, and the presidency, despite the president being elected by the people.

For this reason, some researchers argue that Khomeini effectively nullified the constitution, based on his belief that the legitimacy of the Supreme Jurist does not derive from the people but from his appointment by the (hidden) Imam Mahdi, who has been absent for centuries. Like other Shi’ite Imams, then, he is considered infallible.

This status, they argue, grants him the authority to annul any legitimate agreement made with Iran if he deems that it conflicts with Iran’s interests, or contradicts the principles of Islam. Ali Khamenei, the current Supreme Leader and successor to Khomeini, has mirrored this approach, even extending it to the wider Muslim world.

In 1997, during the eighth Islamic Summit Conference hosted in Tehran, he refused to sit with the Iranian delegation, choosing instead to sit on a platform noticeably higher than those of all other Islamic leaders and their representatives, before delivering a speech full of directives, even referring to himself rather than to Iran—something that frustrated many of the attendees.

Unquestioned leadership

Followers of Shi’ite jurisprudence, particularly within the Usuli tradition and its doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih, confidently believe that their wide latitude for independent reasoning (ijtihad) grants them a unique superiority. Others think this feeling of exceptionalism stems primarily from an inflated sense of their own doctrines.

In reality, ideological interpretations can be shaped more by personal ambitions than by pure scholarship. This entanglement has persisted for centuries, since the death of the eleventh Imam, Hasan al-Askari—the father of the twelfth and final Imam, whose awaited return is central to their faith and leadership expectations.

Personal interpretations—often forcibly linked to the Quran and authentic Sunnah (the sayings, actions, and approvals of the Prophet), and occasionally even elevated to their sacred status—has erased the political agency of the nation while elevating the leader who claims authority based on such interpretations, compelling the masses accordingly.

The leader has therefore effectively become the unquestioned authority over both religious and political affairs, wielding dictatorial power that is then used to suppress opposition internally and pursue expansionist goals externally. Meanwhile, all other constitutionally defined institutions are reduced to mere tools to execute his commands.

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By: Abdelkader Zaoui

Abdelkader Zaoui is the former Ambassador of the Kingdom of Morocco to the United Arab Emirates, and a researcher in international relations