Political Shiism: Ideology, Application, and the Concept of Injustice - Hezbollah in Lebanon as a Case Study
Centralising power
Two or three years ago, political Shi’ism in the Middle East was at or near its zenith. With its power base in Iran and a network of armed groups ready and able to do Tehran’s bidding, the system and the strategy born after 1979 could certainly be said to be working. Iran could be said to have deterrence. Today, much less so.
The battlefield defeats of Iran’s militias, which are typically ideological bedfellows, has led to renewed scrutiny of the ideas, values, beliefs, and more broadly, the mechanics and system of governance in Iran and organisations such as Hezbollah in Lebanon.
The conceptual underpinning of Shi’ite political governance is that it uses the idea of injustice to acquire power. This is far from a new tactic—it was adopted by the Abbasid state around 750 AD to justify its revolt against the deteriorating Umayyad regime as one of “avenging Hussein”.
The Guardian Jurist
The strategy was copied by Ismail Safavid in founding the Safavid state in 1501, and by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. In all cases, authority is centralised under a singular ruler. In the Abbasid state, that ruler was called Commander of the Faithful; in the Safavid state, they were called Ruler by His Order; and in the Islamic Republic, they are called the Guardian Jurist. More commonly, the ruler is known as the Supreme Leader, today embodied by Khomeini’s successor.
Unlike the others, the Guardian Jurist introduces a novel ideological dimension of merging political and religious authority. Traditionally, the ruler held sovereign power, while the jurist was the ideological authority. But in latter-day Iran, these two roles are united in a single individual, consolidating both political and religious legitimacy.
Modern democratic political systems tend to employ a system of checks and balances between the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. This ensures that no one single ‘branch’ accumulates too much power. Yet the Guardian Jurist supervises the policies of all three. Moreover, he makes the final decisions on matters of the economy and foreign policy, and commands the military, deriving his legitimacy from divine authority, thereby establishing a system of ‘divine dictatorship’.
Both modern Safavid political Shi’ism and jihadist Salafi Sunnism (as represented by groups such as Islamic State/ISIS, among others) share the same foundational principle: that the earth must never be without authority, and that Islamic law should govern it. Yet the ideologies interpret and implement this common jurisprudential principle differently. One favours overt violence; the other opts for more subtle tactics.
Strategies and beliefs
Both ideologies pursue the same ultimate objective—to impose absolute control and eradicate opposition to the rule of God—yet ISIS did so via extreme brutality. The Iranian system more closely resembles a virus working within a cell, initially causing minimal external disturbance but inflicting deep harm over time.
The interests of the Muslim Brotherhood (which sits within the umbrella of fundamentalist Sunni jihadism) often coincide with those of political Shi’ite state institutions, not least in their shared desire to liberate Palestine and establish Sharia rule—a hope shared openly by some Hamas officials. Likewise, Ruhollah Khomeini once said: “Our religion is our politics.” By ‘our religion’, he meant Twelver Shi’ism, the largest branch of Shi’a Islam, comprising about 90% of all Shi’ite Muslims.
Pull Quote: Unlike other systems of political Shi’ism, the Guardian Jurist introduces a novel ideological dimension of merging political and religious authority
Why Twelve? Hasan Al-Askari, the eleventh Imam, was born in Medina in 844, a descendent of the Prophet Muhammed. Al-Askari died without leaving an obvious heir, which fragmented the Shi’a into various sects. The Twelvers believe that he did have a son—Hasan al-Askari, known as Muhammad al-Mahdi—who was kept hidden to avoid persecution by the Abbasids. His life is said to be miraculously prolonged until the day he manifests himself again by God’s permission to fill the earth with justice.
Khomeini’s ideology therefore centres on the establishment of a preparatory state aimed at paving the way for the rule of Imam Mahdi. Following the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the regime actively pursued the principle of exporting its revolutionary ideology, using the liberation of Jerusalem as a compelling pretext. The Revolutionary Guards therefore sought out receptive environments.
Engaging Hezbollah
In 1982, contact was made between Iran and Hussein al-Musawi (a former Lebanese politician, leader of the Amal Movement and founding member of Hezbollah). This prompted further meetings between Subhi al-Tufayli (the first Secretary-General of Hezbollah), Abbas al-Musawi (the second Secretary-General of Hezbollah), senior Revolutionary Guards commanders, and prominent Iranian religious scholars.
These three Shi’ite activists had been expelled from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and found refuge in Iran’s Qom Seminary, which served as a haven for their ideological and political activities. During that period, the Shi’ite community in Lebanon was predominantly influenced by the Amal Movement, established by Sayyed Musa al-Sadr.
Iranian authorities disapproved of al-Sadr because he opposed the subordination of Lebanese Shi’ites to the doctrine of the Guardianship of the Jurist. His disappearance in Libya, commonly attributed to assassination, meant that a significant source of independent religious authority for Lebanese Shi’ites was now out of the picture, allowing for a new leader more aligned with Iran’s political and ideological framework.
In early 1982, the Revolutionary Guards entered Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley and set up training camps to prepare Shi’ite fighters to engage in jihad against Israel. Tehran offered financing and weaponry to enable the formation of a military-political force capable of actively participating in the Lebanese civil war. This led first to the Amal Movement, and eventually to Hezbollah as the ‘Islamic Resistance in Lebanon’.
The group’s official designation—the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, rather than the Lebanese Islamic Resistance—showed its subordinate identity as a regional extension of Iran’s broader framework, the phrasing suggesting affiliation not primarily with the Lebanese national context but with the wider Iranian-led Islamic movement.
This was further reinforced by the official Hezbollah anthem, which stated that “the hand of God has extended to us the weapon, and indeed Hezbollah are the victors”. This sanctified the organisation and its armament, presenting both as divinely ordained, with resistance framed as preparatory for the establishment of the Mahdi-led Islamic state.
Iran’s Anna Karenina
Hezbollah had success in the Lebanese civil war (1975-90), fighting not for any national or pan-Arab goals, but operating under a jihadist ideology, deeply rooted in the narrative of victimhood, its fighters ardently seeking martyrdom in the spirit of Karbala (where Imam Hussein and his followers were killed). Soon, Hezbollah established itself as a crucial asset for Iran beyond its borders, serving as an extension of Iran’s influence and a means of exporting the success of the Shi’ite jihadist experience. In short, Hezbollah for Iran was like Anna Karenina for Tolstoy, the Mona Lisa for Da Vinci.
When the Lebanese Civil War came to an end in late 1989 after the Taif Agreement concluded hostilities, all other warring Lebanese militias either surrendered their arms or sold them to the Lebanese state. Hezbollah was the exception. Iran ensured that it remained armed, ostensibly to resist Israel, but its underlying aim was the domination of Lebanon as a strategic stepping stone to the Eastern Mediterranean.
Pull Quote: ‘The hand of God has extended to us the weapon, and indeed Hezbollah are the victors’ (a line from Hezbollah’s official anthem)
Persia had long sought access to the Mediterranean via a robust transport corridor, giving a gateway to Europe. Khomeini’s post-1979 Iran was no different. Hezbollah was key to the strategy. The Revolutionary Guards helped the group expand its arsenal, including with offensive weapons. Increasing Hezbollah’s military strength meant that Iran could exert more control over Lebanon’s decision-making processes.
Israel occupied southern Lebanon from 1982 to 2000, fighting Hezbollah sporadically. Hezbollah’s legitimacy in Lebanon therefore came from its resistance status. When Israel withdrew in 2000, however, Lebanon’s resistance (in the form of Hezbollah) persisted. It had become permanent, not the temporary reaction to occupation it had once been seen as. In practice, the Lebanese state was now governed by Iran.
Weapons protected a corrupt Lebanese cartel and corruption legitimised the continued existence of Hezbollah’s weapons, creating a less-than-virtuous circle—black money and arms reinforcing one another. Opponents of the system were neutralised, often with help from the Syrian state. Targets included Lebanese leaders, politicians, and journalists, such as Rafik Hariri, Gebran Tueni, and Samir Kassir (all killed in 2005).
This created fear, which dissuaded other potential challengers. Yet by 2011, Hezbollah could no longer claim to simply be a Lebanese resistance movement, after it took the decision to enter the Syrian conflict, fighting for the Assad regime—an Iranian regional ally. Over time, Hezbollah operatives began appearing in Yemen and Iraq, too. Iran’s weapon of choice now spoke Arabic with a distinct Lebanese dialect.
Symbolism and discipline
Totalitarian regimes often adopt grand, idealistic goals to shape and control public consciousness. Whereas liberal regimes emphasise individual freedoms, equality, and personal growth, totalitarian regimes prioritise the collective good over individual autonomy. When totalitarian regimes are also ideological, dealing in religious beliefs, they can be particularly dangerous.
At their most motivating, such beliefs can compel entire populations to sacrifice their lives in support of historical injustices, such as at the Battle of Hussein (1,400 years ago), under the promise of heavenly rewards. Embodying these beliefs are revered, almost sacred figures like Hassan Nasrallah, the longstanding former Secretary-General of Hezbollah in Lebanon, who was finally killed by Israel in 2024.
Tens of millions of dollars were spent on sophisticated communication campaigns to elevate Nasrallah’s image as leader and saviour. Removing him from the public eye for years not only protected him physically, it also positioned him as a symbolic figure akin to a Persian emperor or an Egyptian pharaoh. This helped ensure obedience from Hezbollah’s followers, many of whom would have sacrificed their lives for Nasrallah.
Hezbollah put great emphasis on internal discipline, but this discipline clearly failed in recent years, given Israel’s obvious intelligence penetration in 2024, allowing it to target the group’s communications devices (such as pagers), senior leaders, and weapons.
Defeat exposed Hezbollah’s considerable technological and strategic shortcomings. Built on illusions and an inflated sense of power, it was found to be ill-prepared for battle, and crumbled in the face of Israel’s precision bombing. This posed a huge problem for the Iranians. Hezbollah was its jewel in the proxy crown. As one commentator later put it, resisting stealth aircraft needs more than prayer alone.
A leach on Lebanon
To sustain its influence, Hezbollah sought to maintain the Lebanese state’s weakness, establishing Unit 900—a covert division whose tasks included dismantling Lebanon’s institutional framework, infiltrating and corrupting state organs (including intelligence and security agencies) and undermining anyone who sought reform.
Hezbollah also isolated the Shi’ite community in Lebanon, labelling as ‘Zionist’ anyone who opposed Iranian policy. Independent minds were shunned, particularly if they opposed Hezbollah’s agenda. Prominent figures like Sayyed Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah and Sayyed Ali al-Amin were marginalised, quietly accused of betraying the community’s interests.
Pull Quote: When totalitarian regimes are also ideological, dealing in religious beliefs, they can be particularly dangerous
The pattern of physical elimination to silence dissent began with the disappearance of Sayyed Musa al-Sadr, a figure with a distinctly Lebanese approach, and continued with the assassination of figures like Luqman Slim, a Lebanese resistance leader who put Lebanon first. Slowly, Hezbollah consolidated power. The Shi’ite community were effectively trapped by Hezbollah, which was both its captor and ‘saviour’.
Power let the party control Shi’ite representatives in the Lebanese parliament by means of coercion, threat, and intimidation. As a result, all 27 Shi’ite parliamentary seats were firmly aligned with Hezbollah, leaving no room for independent Shi’ite representation. The community had effectively been called to heel by Iran’s Supreme Leader.
Having bought Lebanese media outlets and established a veritable social media army, Hezbollah’s communications team was manipulating public perception to shape societal discourse. This had the effect of subduing any would-be protests against changes the party sought to make. Dissenters and those with alternative views were not only unwelcome but ostracised.
By controlling media, information, and public discourse, the party bought loyalty and dominance, especially over Lebanon’s Shi’ites. Its influence even extended to the education, establishing a network of schools teaching its own ideology (despite this being in violation of Lebanese law), producing thousands of indoctrinated students (aka “Khamenei’s Lebanese boys”) ready to sacrifice themselves for ‘the cause’.
Recipe for statehood
Today, a fully-functioning and sovereign Lebanese state remains an elusive goal of the many Lebanese who do not support Hezbollah and Iran. To give true statehood a chance, Hezbollah and other militias must first disarm, the country’s education system must be reformed, its media liberated from ideological capture, and the power structures that have hindered any recovery must be dismantled. That is not an easy to-do list.
Most important is weapons. As long as Hezbollah remains armed, it will perpetuate a system that destroys the state from within. The Lebanese state alone must hold the monopoly on weapons. The Lebanese Army simply cannot be one of several armed groups operating at whim within the territory.
There are glimmers of hope for those seeking a different system. After Hezbollah’s heavy military defeat at the hands of Israel in late 2024, Lebanon elected a new president (the army chief) and appointed a new prime minister (a senior judge). Neither is known to have any strong affiliation with Hezbollah, whose political allies distanced themselves from the group, especially after Hassan Nasrallah was assassinated.
For some, this is the start of a new political era in Lebanon. For those desperate to see change, reforms are not being implemented fast enough. A key issue is whether Lebanese politicians as a whole embrace the fundamental principle that state control over weapons is essential. Reforms in education, such as changing the curriculum, will also help shift the Shi’ite community’s loyalty away from a knee-jerk allegiance to Iran’s Supreme Leader towards Lebanese unity, national identity, and civic responsibility.
Finally, restrictions on media freedom must be lifted and any efforts made through the media to undermine state structures must be stopped, especially those promoting subjugation under the Guardianship of the Jurist and Hezbollah. Media outlets must operate with awareness, independence, integrity, and transparency, with close monitoring of funding sources.
For those still engaged in the project of projecting political Shi’ism in the Middle East, these would all be unwelcome changes. That alone may be reason to make them.
__
By: Dr. Ahmad Yassine
*Dr. Ahmad Yassine is a Lebanese researcher and writer. He is a Lecturer in Political Geography.
*
