Iran: Targeting dissidents in Europe

Recently, an important investigative article was published in the famous German daily Die Welt (9 December 2025) and later republished in French by Le Figaro (13 December 2025). This investigation exposed in detail how Iran’s intelligence services have built and expanded a covert espionage and intimidation network in Germany, targeting Iranian exiles and particularly organized opposition groups.
The article reconstructs the case of Javid Navari, a 48-year-old Iranian teacher from Shiraz who sought asylum in Germany with his mother and brother. Having escaped Iran in the hope of a safer life, Navari was contacted shortly after his arrival by an individual using the alias “Mahdi”, communicating via WhatsApp from an Iranian phone number. The message was chillingly direct: the agent made clear that he had recently spoken to Navari’s relatives still in Iran. For Navari, this was an unmistakable signal that Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence was reaching across borders to exert pressure.
By threatening family members in Iran, confiscating their phones, or summoning them for interrogation, agents force exiles in Europe into unwanted cooperation. Those who comply are cynically referred to within intelligence jargon as “disposable agents”. The investigation also reveals that in some instances, threats escalated to include explicit intimidation and even threats of sexual violence, underscoring the brutality of the methods employed.
Victims are instructed to attend opposition rallies, identify participants, provide names and contacts, and report on internal dynamics—while being warned that disclosure of these contacts would itself destroy their chances of remaining in Germany. This is followed by veiled threats: cooperation will ensure silence from Tehran, while refusal could jeopardize asylum status or even result in forced return to Iran.
Javad Dabiran, spokesperson for the NCRI, told Die Welt that the organization documented at least 97 such incidents in 2025 alone, describing the escalation as unprecedented. The NCRI, a coalition of Iranian opposition groups with a long history of organized political activity, has become a particular focus of Iranian intelligence operations due to its visibility, public demonstrations, and international advocacy.
German authorities broadly confirm this assessment. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) acknowledged to Die Welt a sustained and elevated level of Iranian espionage activity. The agency warned that Iranian intelligence services pursue the interests of the regime “with determination”, including the use of methods amounting to state-sponsored terrorism.
This situation is reminiscent of a similar terrorist operation by Iran that Albanian police thwarted in 2018. A criminal gang controlled by the Iranian regime was planning a terrorist operation against the People’s Mojahedin (MEK) in Albania. The police identified members of this gang, including an Iranian named Alireza Naghshan. Alireza Naghshan was reportedly a recruit of the Iranian regime’s Nejat Society, who traveled to Albania to gather intelligence to carry out terrorist operations against the MEK. The Nejat Society has now officially established a branch in Albania, and has identified an Albanian named Aldo Sulollari as its head. Sulollari went to Iran last fall. He actively relays the officials of the Iranian regime’s lies and demonization of Iranian refugees MEK residing in the compound Ashraf, Albania. Some Iranians who collaborated with the Iranian regime’s Ministry of Intelligence in Albania through threats or bribery have come forward with some details. One of these individuals, Rahman Mohammadian, in a publicly released complaint to the UN in March 2025, described Nejat Society as an MOIS cover posing as an NGO, focused on harassing MEK families, terrorism, and demonization.
The Bfv’s statement that the Iranian regime’s methods amount to state terrorism confirms Mohammadian’s statements about the Nejat Society.
These operations abroad coincide with an intensified wave of repression inside Iran. The article notes that more than 1,000 executions were carried out in the first nine months of 2025, a level not seen since the 1990s. According to the NCRI, at least 17 political prisoners currently face imminent execution for alleged links to the opposition PMOI. Participation in opposition events in Europe has, in some cases, been classified by Iranian courts as “blasphemy” or espionage—offences carrying the death penalty. This represents an attempt to give legal cover to what amounts to transnational repression.
The findings raise serious questions for European policymakers about the protection of political refugees, the security of democratic space, and the response required to counter systematic transnational intimidation by the Iranian regime.